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Introduction:	The	Key	Brexit	Questions	
	
The	general	public	 in	Northern	 Ireland	has	not	been	well	 served	by	the	Brexit	debate.	
The	UK	debate	has	been	concerned	with	the	implications	of	Brexit	for	the	UK	as	a	whole,	
and	not	on	 specific	 issues	affecting	Northern	 Ireland.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Northern	
Ireland	 Assembly	 elections	 in	 May	 2016	 truncated	 the	 opportunity	 for	 the	 Northern	
Ireland	parties	to	conduct	an	effective	campaign.	
	
Deeper	reasons	also	exist	for	this	malaise.	For	decades,	Northern	Ireland’s	place	within	
the	European	Union	has	been	understood	through	the	 lens	of	nationalist	and	unionist	
preoccupations.	Unionism	has	never	been	instinctively	pro-European.	For	a	creed	based	
on	the	defence	of	 the	UK’s	sovereignty	over	Northern	 Ireland	the	pooling	of	 that	very	
sovereignty	 in	European	 institutions	seemed	to	carry	an	existential	 threat.	Conversely,	
nationalism	has	often	been	more	divided	in	its	approach	to	the	EU.	For	figures	such	as	
John	Hume,	Europe	 indeed	offered	a	means	to	dilute	the	UK’s	sovereignty;	 the	nation	
state,	he	claimed,	was	a	concept	which	was	‘dead	and	gone’.	Others	weren’t	so	sure.	As	
socialist	republican	Bernadette	McAliskey	retorted,	‘I	haven’t	had	mine	yet’.		
	
This	 report	 is	 not	 a	 campaigning	 document,	 but	 it	 does	 attempt	 to	 inform	 some	 key	
areas	of	the	Brexit	debate.	It	conveys	our	concerns,	estimations,	and	opinions	as	a	group	
made	 up	 of	 legal	 academics	 researching	 in	 international	 law,	 trade	 law,	 UK	
constitutional	 law,	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 EU	 law	 on	 some	 key	 aspects	 of	 how	 Brexit	
would	 affect	 Northern	 Ireland.	 We	 do	 not	 seek	 to	 address	 all	 of	 the	 implications	 of	
Brexit,	but	only	those	within	our	areas	of	expertise.		 	
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PART	ONE:	TRADE	AND	TRAVEL	ISSUES	
	
1. The	Ireland-UK	Common	Travel	Area	and	the	European	Union	
	
Since	the	foundation	of	the	Free	State	in	1922	the	position	of	Irish	citizens	in	the	UK	and	
of	the	UK	citizens	in	Ireland	has	been	unique:	both	countries	treat	each	other’s	nationals	
as	equivalent	to	citizens	in	almost	all	material	respects.	To	date,	there	has	been	little	for	
the	 EU	 to	 be	 concerned	with	 regarding	 this	 special	 relationship	 –	 since	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Amsterdam,	a	Protocol	attached	to	the	EU	Treaties	permits	 ‘free	movement’	between	
Ireland	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 to	 continue.	 Both	 states	 remain	 outside	 of	 the	
Schengen	passport-free	travel	zone	and	this	has	meant	that	the	particular	nature	of	the	
UK-Ireland	 relationship	 can	 continue	 despite	 changes	 within	 and	 amongst	 Schengen	
states.	
	
But,	the	UK’s	possible	withdrawal	from	the	EU	means	that	a	closer	look	at	how	the	two	
countries’	special	relationship	fits	within	EU	rules	and	what	Brexit	could	mean	is	needed.	
While	much	will	depend	on	that	nature	of	post	Brexit	negotiations	between	the	EU	and	
the	UK	(rather	than	with	Ireland	particularly)	there	is	virtually	no	possibility	the	border	
and	 the	 movement	 of	 goods,	 services	 and	 individuals	 will	 remain	 as	 it	 is	 currently	
operating.	
	
The	openness	of	travel	between	the	two	countries	
dates	from	1922	when	the	Irish	Free	State	decided	
to	 enforce	 the	 same	 travel	 arrangements	 as	 the	
UK.	 Neither	 country	 required	 passports	 for	 travel	
between	each	other.	 Following	 the	Second	World	
War,	 the	 UK’s	 Ireland	 Act	 1949	 formalised	 the	
special	relationship	by	declaring	that	Ireland,	while	
no	 longer	a	dominion	of	 the	UK,	 is	not	 treated	 in	
Campaigning	Claim	
“There’s	a	land	border	between	
France	and	Switzerland	and	you	
don't	 have	 sealing	 of	 the	
border,	so	why	would	Northern	
Ireland	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	
Ireland	be	any	different?”	
Sammy	Wilson,	DUP.		
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law	as	a	“foreign	country”.		
	
In	 1952	 a	 Common	 Travel	 Area	 (CTA)	 was	 agreed,	 in	 place	 of	 the	 existing	 informal	
arrangements.	 This	 travel	 area	 covers	 the	 two	 states.	 The	 CTA	 enables	 UK	 and	 Irish	
nationals	to	be	treated	almost	identically	within	both	states.	For	example,	UK	citizens	in	
Ireland	and	Irish	citizens	in	the	UK	have	the	right	to	vote	in	local,	national	and	European	
elections.	Both	 sets	of	 citizens	enjoy	unfettered	access	 to	employment,	 social	welfare	
and	 healthcare.	 The	 few	 exceptions	 to	 this	 equal	 treatment	 are	 political	 in	 nature:	
though	Irish	citizens	can	run	for	the	UK	Parliament,	UK	citizens	cannot	be	elected	to	the	
Dáil,	nor	can	they	vote	in	constitutional	referenda	or	Presidential	elections.	
	
The	 threat	 of	 Brexit	 has	 raised	 two	 very	 particular	 questions:	 first,	 does	 the	 special	
relationship	still	matter	now	that	both	countries	are	 in	the	EU?	And,	second,	 if	the	UK	
leaves,	what	does	this	mean	for	Ireland?	The	welfare	rights	stemming	from	the	special	
relationship	are	virtually	identical	to	those	that	any	EU	citizen	possesses.	However,	the	
UK’s	welfare	setup	is	based	upon	the	CTA,	with	several	UK	welfare	rights	require	prior	
residency	 within	 the	 CTA.	 While	 all	 EU	 nationals	 living	 within	 the	 CTA	 for	 a	 specific	
period	 can	 access	 these	 benefits,	 the	 rule	 is	 clearly	 there	 to	 benefit	 Irish	 and	 UK	
nationals	living	in	Ireland	who	subsequently	move	to	the	UK.	
	
So,	while	much	of	the	‘special	relationship’	is	now	simply	part	and	parcel	of	being	an	EU	
Member	State,	the	CTA	still	matters.	This	 is	why	both	Ireland	and	the	UK	opted	out	of	
the	Schengen	agreement,	which	encompasses	all	 other	EU	members,	 as	well	 as	 some	
non-EU	states	 such	as	Norway,	 Switzerland,	 Iceland	and	Lichtenstein.	 	 The	UK	did	not	
wish	to	join,	and	by	all	accounts,	Ireland	subsequently	declined	joining	so	as	to	preserve	
its	‘special	relationship’	with	the	UK.	Not	joining	also	enables	the	CTA	to	cover	the	Isle	of	
Man	and	the	Channel	Islands,	neither	of	which	are	in	the	EU.	
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Pre-referendum	 negotiations	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 Irish	 Governments	 covered	 the	
possibility	 that	any	potential	post-Brexit	welfare	restrictions	 imposed	upon	EU	citizens	
would	not	apply	to	Irish	nationals.	EU	law,	however,	requires	equal	treatment	between	
all	 EU	 nationals	 and	 explicitly	 prohibits	 discrimination	 purely	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	
nationality.	Cameron	pointed	to	an	EU	Treaty	provision,	Protocol	20,	permitting	the	UK’s	
grant	of	‘special	treatment’	for	Irish	nationals	under	the	CTA,	but	all	that	this	provision	
covers	is	the	arrangements	for	the	‘movement	of	persons’	between	the	two	countries.	It	
does	 not	 mention	 welfare	 arrangements,	 and	 although	 the	 special	 electoral	 law	
arrangements	 for	 Irish	 citizens	 have	 not	 been	 subject	 to	 challenge,	 it	 is	 optimistic	 to	
think	that	Brussels	would	permit	this	protocol	to	remain	in	effect	in	the	event	of	Brexit.		
	
If	the	UK	fully	withdraws	from	the	EU,	Ireland	faces	difficult	choices.	It	would	be	the	only	
EU	member	 state	outside	of	 the	Schengen	area	which	 is	not	working	 towards	 joining.	
Should	Ireland	choose	to	join	Schengen	–	and	there	may	be	pressure	on	it	from	Brussels	
to	do	so	–	the	EU	(and	not	Ireland)	would	determine	how	the	Irish	side	of	the	Ireland-UK	
border	would	operate.	As	Brexit	is	likely	to	rebalance	Ireland’s	trade	relationships	away	
from	the	UK	and	towards	the	remainder	of	 the	EU,	economic	 imperatives	might	point	
towards	joining	Schengen	even	if	Brussels	was	not	to	encourage	such	a	step.	
	
Brexit	would	 also	mean	 that	 the	 Ireland-UK	 border	would	 become	 a	 part	 of	 the	 EU’s	
external	 border.	 The	 Vote	 Leave	 campaign	 remains	 committed	 to	 ceasing	 the	 UK’s	
implementation	of	EU	regulations	and	UK	contributions	to	the	EU	budget.	It	is	therefore	
unlikely	 that	 the	UK	would	opt	 to	remain	 in	 the	European	Economic	Area	 (EEA)	 in	 the	
event	of	Brexit,	as	EEA	countries	 like	Norway	–	despite	not	being	EU	member	states	–	
are	 bound	 by	 a	 range	 of	 EU	 rules	 and	make	 high	 per	 capita	 contributions	 to	 the	 EU	
budget.	If	the	UK	did	not	become	an	EEA	state	following	Brexit,	Brussels	would	have	to	
determine	 the	 arrangements	 by	 which	 UK	 nationals,	 capital,	 goods	 and	 services	 gain	
access	to	Ireland	to	enable	the	internal	market	to	function.		
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Upon	 Brexit,	 the	 UK-Ireland	 border	 would	
represent	 an	 external	 border	 to	 the	 EU	 as	 a	
whole.		There	are	no	other	‘external’	EU	borders	
that	 do	 not	 come	 with	 border	 controls.	 	 An	
interesting	case	study	in	this	respect	is	the	Faroe	
Islands,	which	declined	to	join	Schengen	when	all	
other	members	of	the	Nordic	Passport	Union	did.		
The	consequence	of	 this	 refusal	has	been	 for	all	
Nordic	Passport	Union	countries	within	Schengen	
to	 adopt	 stringent	 border	 controls	 vis-à-vis	 the	
Faroe	 Islands:	 individuals	 from	 the	 Faroe	 Islands	
are	 passport-checked	 when	 entering	 any	 other	 Nordic	 Passport	 Union	 states,	 even	
though	individuals	from	the	other	Nordic	Passport	Union	states	can	still	travel	without	
controls	to	the	Faroe	Islands.			
	
Ireland	is	not	in	Schengen	at	present,	but	even	so,	the	Nordic	Passport	Union	represents	
the	closest	analogy	to	the	CTA	that	we	have.	 In	 it	we	can	see	that	the	EU	ensured	the	
protection	of	 its	external	border	notwithstanding	the	pre-existing	 ‘special	 relationship’	
between	the	Faroe	Islands	and	the	other	Nordic	countries,	and	regardless	of	the	small	
number	 of	 individuals	 involved.	 A	 second	 example	 from	 the	 region	 is	 the	 border	
between	Norway	and	 Sweden,	which	 as	 an	EU	external	 border.	As	part	 of	 the	Nordic	
Passport	 Union	 and	 Schengen	 there	 are	 not	 immigration	 controls	 between	 the	
countries,	nonetheless	as	Norway	represents	an	EU	external	border	Sweden	maintains	
customs	checks.	
	
Maintaining	 the	 CTA	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit	would	 also	 be	 difficult	 to	 square	with	 the	
immigration	arguments	advanced	by	Vote	Leave	in	the	referendum	campaign.	It	would	
enable	EU	nationals	with	a	right	to	reside	in	Ireland	to	become	Irish	citizens	and	thereby	
gain	 unrestricted	 access	 to	 the	UK.	 Although	 this	 has	 not	 historically	 involved	 a	 large	
The	Countries	of	the	Nordic	Passport	Union	(an	
arrangement	that	like	the	UK-Ireland	CTA)	pre-
dates	any	of	these	countries’	EU	membership.	
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number	of	individuals,	unrestricted	migration	from	Ireland	does	make	the	Brexit	aim	of	
controlling	 immigration	 into	 the	UK	more	difficult.	A	 “Leave-friendly”	UK	Government	
could	view	the	CTA	as	a	last	EU-migration-related	loophole	to	be	closed.		
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2. Post	Brexit:	Options	for	the	Common	Travel	Area	
	
Under	 law	 in	 the	UK	 and	 Ireland	 the	 citizens	 of	 both	 countries	 are,	with	 some	minor	
exceptions,	 treated	 identically	 in	 law.	 Passport-free	 travel	 and	 ease	 of	 access	 to	
employment	 has	 been	 the	 norm	 since	 Irish	
independence,	albeit	for	much	of	the	history	of	the	
border	customs	checks	existed.	The	UK	 leaving	 the	
EU	 would	 have	 significant	 consequences	 on	 the	
continuation	 of	 the	 CTA	 arrangements.	 In	 the	
aftermath	of	Brexit,	 Ireland	would	be	 faced	with	 a	
choice	 about	 which	 relationship	 to	 prioritise:	 the	
27-member	EU	with	its	Schengen	area,	or	the	stand-
alone	UK.		We	therefore	map	out	legal	options	for	a	
post-Brexit	reform	of	the	CTA.	
	
a.	The	UK	leaves	the	EU	and	the	ROI	joins	the	Schengen	area	
	
While	the	UK	remains	the	Irish	Republic’s	single	most	important	state	trading	partner,	in	
2015	combined	trade	with	other	EU	members	was	worth	more	to	the	Irish	economy.	As	
such,	it	is	possible	it	may	opt	to	join	the	Schengen	area	in	order	to	facilitate	trade	with	
its	EU	partners.	
	
Should	 Ireland	enter	 the	Schengen	area,	 it	would	 find	 itself	 in	an	exact	parallel	 to	 the	
Nordic	 Passport	 Union	 outlined	 above.	 A	 hard	 border	 would	 come	 in	 practice	 into	
existence,	 requiring	 both	 EU	 immigration	 and	 customs	 law	 to	 be	 applied	 at	 the	 Irish	
border.	 Ireland’s	 commitments	 to	 the	 EU,	 which	 have	 been	 adopted	 into	 the	 Irish	
Constitution,	would	take	precedent	 in	domestic	 law	over	any	other	treaty-based	trade	
commitment	with	the	UK.	With	the	protections	that	the	CTA	has	enjoyed	under	Protocol	
20	to	the	EU	treaties	no	 longer	operative	 in	the	event	of	Brexit,	 Ireland	will	 likely	face	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 relationship	 between	 the	
UK	 and	 Ireland	 when	 it	 comes	
to	 this	 common	 travel	 area	 is	
decades	 older	 than	 our	 EU	
membership	 and	 doesn’t	
depend	on	it.”	
Theresa	Villiers,	Secretary	of	
State	for	Northern	Ireland.		
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legal	and	political	pressure	not	to	extend	more	favourable	movement	arrangements	to	
UK	citizens	than	it	does	to	EU	citizens.	Ireland	could	re-negotiate	the	CTA,	but	Brussels	
would	ensure	that	such	renegotiation	takes	place	on	the	basis	of	its	EU	commitments.		
	
b.	The	UK	leaves	the	EU	and	the	ROI	does	not	join	Schengen	
	
Even	if	Ireland	did	not	enter	Schengen,	the	UK’s	access	to	Ireland	for	goods,	services	and	
capital	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 restrictions	 as	 for	 other	 non-Schengen	 non-EU	
states.	At	 a	minimum,	a	 customs	 check	would	be	 required	at	 the	border.	However,	 if	
Ireland	 is	 not	 in	 Schengen,	 Irish	 and	 UK	migration	 policy	 (and	 thus	 passport	 control)	
could	in	theory	remain	coordinated.	In	practice,	however,	it	is	likely	that	the	checking	of	
all	traffic	across	the	border	would	be	necessary	even	with	coordinated	migration	policy.	
This	is	because	passport-free	travel	over	the	border	(which	might	be	permissible	under	a	
coordinated	migration	policy)	would	make	it	impossible	to	distinguish	between	business	
and	 personal	 travel.	 The	 inability	 to	 make	 such	 distinctions	 would	 make	 the	
enforcement	of	the	EU’s	customs	arrangements	nearly	impossible.	
	
These	issues	could	be	ameliorated	by	the	negotiation	of	a	customs	union	or	a	free	trade	
area	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 EU.	 If	 the	 UK	 is	 outside	 Schengen	 any	 negotiation	
regarding	the	UK’s	relationship	with	the	EU,	for	example	regarding	the	creation	of	a	free	
trade	 area,	 would	 necessarily	 include	 consideration	 of	 the	 land	 border	 with	 the	 Irish	
Republic.	However,	 leaving	aside	the	“mega-regional”	trade	agreements	that	the	EU	is	
currently	working	 on	 concluding	with	 Canada	 and	US,	 amongst	 other	 states,	 the	 only	
“free	 trade”	 arrangements	 that	 have	 existed	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 Member	
States	 to	date	have	necessitated	acceptance	of	 free	movement	 rules.	The	 ‘Leave’	and	
‘Remain’	 campaigns	have	both	made	clear	at	 this	 stage	 that	 the	 so-called	Switzerland	
option	does	not	appeal	to	them	–	at	which	point,	 there	again	 is	no	existing	precedent	
for	 post-Brexit	 UK-EU	 trade	 relations.	 Until	 the	 terms	 of	 this	 re-negotiation	 are	
determined,	the	impact	on	the	border	would	remain	an	open	question	and	would	lead	
Brexit,	Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland	
	
11	
	
	
to	 uncertainty	 and	 potential	 disruption	 for	 all	 those	 who	 regularly	 cross	 the	 border,	
including	both	passport	and	customs	checks.	
	
c.	The	UK	leaves	the	EU	and	both	the	UK	and	the	ROI	join	the	Schengen	area	
	
It	 would	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 UK	 to	 join	 the	 Schengen	 area	 even	 if	 it	 left	 the	 EU.	
Liechtenstein,	Iceland,	Norway	and	Switzerland	are	all	non-EU	countries	that	are	part	of	
the	Schengen	area.	 If	both	 Ireland	and	the	UK	chose	to	 join	this	would	make	the	 land	
border	much	less	problematic	–	a	direct	parallel	to	the	Nordic	Passport	Union	becomes	
possible.	However,	given	that	many	of	the	underlying	rationales	for	leaving	the	EU	are	
related	to	migration	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	the	UK	will	adopt	this	course.	It	would	also	
not	remove	the	need	for	customs	checks	for	goods	entering	the	EU	market	at	the	Irish	
border.	
	
d.	Internal	Controls	on	travel	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Remainder	of	the	UK	
	
The	difficulty	which	the	Vote	Leave	campaign	has	found	in	suggesting	a	coherent	model	
for	 the	 Irish	 Border	 after	 Brexit	 has	 opened	 up	 the	 field	 to	 a	 range	 of	 seemingly	 far-
fetched	proposals.	The	Northern	Ireland	Affairs	Committee	first	mooted	the	idea	of	the	
Northern	 Ireland-Republic	 of	 Ireland	 border	 remaining	 open,	 but	 checks	 on	 travellers	
from	Northern	 Ireland	 accessing	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 UK.	 This	 singly	 unattractive	 solution,	
which	David	Cameron	mooted	at	 Prime	Ministers’	Questions	 as	 a	 possible	post-Brexit	
scenario,	 would	 leave	 Northern	 Ireland	 no	 longer	 a	 member	 of	 the	 EU	 and	
simultaneously	restrict	access	from	Northern	Ireland	to	the	remainder	of	the	UK.	Such	
an	option	would	not	 remove	 the	need	 for	 customs	checks	at	 the	Republic	of	 Ireland–
Northern	Ireland	border	as	an	EU	external	border.	
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3. Post	Brexit:	The	Advantages	of	Dual	UK-Irish	Nationality	
	
In	 light	of	 the	EU	referendum,	genealogy	has	become	much	more	 important	 for	many	
UK	citizens.		Individuals	born	in	Northern	Ireland	to	parents	who	are	Irish	or	UK	citizens	
are	automatically	entitled	to	claim	Irish	citizenship.	Those	born	in	Great	Britain	with	an	
Irish	 parent	 or	 grandparent	 are	 also	 entitled	 to	 an	 Irish	 passport	 by	 applying	 for	 Irish	
Citizenship	through	Ireland’s	system	of	Foreign	Birth	Registration.	Doing	so	enables	such	
a	person	to	claim	dual	nationality	alongside	their	British	citizenship.	If	the	current	rules	
remain	in	effect	in	the	event	of	Brexit,	applying	for	an	Irish	passport	could	offer	some	UK	
citizens	a	route	to	retaining	their	EU	citizenship.	
	
While	 those	 in	 favour	 of	 Brexit	 are	 obviously	 willing	 to	 forego	 the	 benefits	 of	 EU	
citizenship	 in	order	 for	 the	UK	 to	 take	 “control”	over	migration	 to	 the	UK	 there	are	a	
series	of	consequences	for	individuals	travelling	or	
working	 within	 Europe.	 Unless	 or	 until	 a	 visa-
waiver	 scheme	 is	 negotiated	 following	 Brexit,	 UK	
citizens	 will	 have	 to	 adopt	 a	 “pay	 as	 you	 go”	
approach	 to	 traveling	 to	EU	countries,	completing	
the	necessary	entry	 requirements	 to	enable	 them	
to	 travel	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 now	 for	 travel	 to	 many	
non-EU	countries).	Moreover,	senior	figures	within	
the	Vote	Leave	campaign	have	maintained	that	travellers	to	and	from	Europe	will	need	
visas	 to	 enter	 the	 UK	 post-Brexit.	 If	 such	 a	 policy	 were	 pursued,	 the	 EU	 would	 put	
reciprocal	 arrangements	 in	place.	 The	 consequences	 for	 the	 Irish-UK	border	would	be	
similar	to	those	noted	above;	thorough	migration	checks	at	the	border.	
	
Even	 if	 a	 visa-waiver	 scheme	 is	 introduced,	many	of	 the	benefits	 currently	 associated	
with	 EU	 citizenship	will	 likely	 be	 lost	 under	 any	post-Brexit	 arrangements.	UK	 citizens	
will	almost	certainly	no	 longer	be	able	 to	 rely	on	 the	European	Health	 Insurance	Card	
Campaigning	Claim	
“You	 have	 got	 the	 Vienna	
convention,	 which	 guarantees	
the	 rights	 of	 existing	 citizens	
and	existing	arrangements.”	
Gisela	Stuart,	Vote	Leave	Chair.		
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scheme	 in	 lieu	of	 travel	 insurance,	because	 the	UK	would	be	highly	unlikely	 to	extend	
reciprocal	protections	to	EU	citizens	in	light	of	Vote	Leave’s	emphasis	upon	the	pressure	
such	 commitments	 place	 upon	 the	 NHS.	 Even	 if	 a	 visa	waiver	 scheme	 is	 adopted	 for	
travel,	 it	will	not	enable	UK	citizens	to	work,	study	and	access	support	as	 if	 they	were	
nationals	of	the	host	state.		
	
At	present	1.2	million	people	born	in	the	UK	are	estimated	to	live	in	other	EU	countries.	
For	host	 states	 (some,	 such	as	France,	Spain	and	 Ireland	with	 large	populations	of	UK	
citizens)	Brexit	would	need	to	be	followed	by	a	transition	period	in	which	the	status	of	
resident	 UK	 nationals	 is	 changed	 from	 EU	 citizens.	 At	 issue	 in	 the	 Brexit	 debate	 is	
whether	 this	 change	 in	 status	 would	 entail	 a	 diminution	 of	 rights	 for	 UK	 citizens	
currently	 resident	 in	 other	 EU	 countries,	 or	 even	 the	 deportation	 of	 UK	 citizens	 no	
longer	 resident	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 EU	 citizenship.	 Brexit	 supporters	 have	 been	 keen	 to	
stress	that	under	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	rights	already	accrued	
under	a	treaty	do	not	end	on	the	termination	of	the	arrangement.	However,	the	Vienna	
Convention	applies	to	the	rights	of	state	parties	to	a	treaty,	not	to	individuals	who	gain	
interests	as	a	result	of	such	an	arrangement.	After	Greenland	left	the	EEC	in	1985,	the	
existing	 individual	 rights	 were	 continued	 to	 be	 respected.	 However,	 the	 numbers	
involved	were	small	and	the	country’s	departure	less	high-profile.	
	
The	UK	Government	maintains	that	EU	obligations	only	take	effect	in	UK	law	as	a	result	
of	the	European	Communities	Act	1972	(a	position	affirmed	in	the	European	Union	Act	
2011).	The	repeal	of	this	legislation	would	therefore	end	the	basis	in	law	for	the	rights	
enjoyed	by	EU	citizens	who	wish	to	remain	resident	in	the	UK.	The	protections	afforded	
by	the	Vienna	Convention	are	at	best	of	a	reciprocal	nature.	Any	efforts	on	the	part	of	a	
post-Brexit	UK	Government	to	restrict	the	rights	enjoyed	by	existing	EU	residents	would	
relieve	EU	countries	of	any	obligations	they	may	have	to	maintain	the	rights	of	their	UK	
residents.	 If	 they	 are	 not	 to	 fall	 foul	 of	 any	 upheavals	 consequent	 upon	 Brexit,	 the	
hundreds	of	 thousands	of	UK	nationals	 living	 in	 Ireland,	and	even	greater	numbers	of	
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Irish	citizens	living	in	the	UK	will	be	reliant	upon	the	negotiation	of	on-going	reciprocal	
CTA	arrangements.	
	
The	upheaval	of	Brexit	means	that	for	those	UK	citizens	who	wish	to	travel	to,	work	in,	
or	study	 in	EU	countries,	becoming	a	national	of	an	EU	country	(and	therefore	getting	
EU	 citizenship)	 would	 offer	 an	 obvious	 solution.	 But	 changing	 nationality	 is	 often	 an	
expensive	and	complicated	decision	(to	say	nothing	of	the	emotional	ties	of	identity	that	
nationality	 raises).	 To	 naturalise	 in	 their	 country	 of	 residence,	 they	 would	 have	 to	
navigate	 its	 immigration	 and	 nationality	 systems	 and	 establish	 their	 value	 to	 its	
economy	 before	 they	 would	 be	 accepted	 as	 citizens.	 If	 successful,	 this	 might	 mean	
having	 dual	 nationality	 (for	 example	 being	 a	 French	 and	 UK	 citizen)	 or	 having	 to	
surrender	 UK	 citizenship	 altogether	 (some	 EU	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	 Netherlands,	
usually	require	their	nationals	to	renounce	other	citizenships	and	the	UK	itself	has	dual	
nationality	restrictions).		
	
Naturalisation	processes	are	almost	always	extensive.	France,	for	example,	requires	that	
an	 individual	 seeking	 to	 naturalise	 to	 have	 lived	 in	 France	 for	 5	 years	 and	 be	 able	 to	
speak	 French.	 Irish	 citizenship	 (other	 than	 the	 sanguinity	 route)	 requires	 8	 years	 of	
residency.	 This	 is	why	 the	 Irish	 sanguinity	 connection	 could	 be	 so	 important	 to	many	
people	if	the	UK	votes	for	Brexit.	It	gives	as	many	as	six	million	people	living	in	the	UK	an	
easier	route	to	getting	EU	citizenship.		
	
If	Ireland’s	comparatively	relaxed	rules	enabling	those	with	immediate	Irish	ancestry	to	
claim	 citizenship	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 become	 too	 popular	 as	 a	 backdoor	 to	 the	 EU,	
Ireland	 might	 have	 to	 reconsider	 these	 arrangements	 under	 pressure	 from	 Brussels.	
Waiting	 times	 for	 processing	 Irish	 passport	 applications	 are	 already	 lengthened	 as	 an	
increasing	number	of	people	living	in	Great	Britain	are	making	use	of	the	‘granny	rule’	to	
secure	EU	citizenship	in	the	event	of	Brexit.	
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PART	II:	PEACE	AND	PROSPERITY	ISSUES	
	
4. Comparative	Advantage	after	Brexit	
	
One	of	the	primary	reasons	cited	by	the	Vote	Leave	campaign	in	support	of	a	Brexit	 is	
that	it	would	enable	the	UK	to	conclude	its	own	trade	agreements,	and	consequently,	to	
trade	‘more	freely’	than	it	can	currently	do.	At	present,	its	current	trade	agreements	are	
negotiated	by	the	EU	as	a	whole,	and	Vote	Leave	believes	this	process	to	be	intolerably	
slow	and	contrary	to	UK	interests.	They	believe,	in	other	words,	that	trade	is	absolutely	
necessary,	but	that	the	UK	is	better	off	pursuing	free	trade	alone.	
	
A	 key	 theory	 underpinning	 global	 desires	 for	 trade	 that	 is	 as	 ‘free’	 as	 possible	 is	
eighteenth	 century	 political	 economist	 David	 Ricardo’s	 concept	 of	 comparative	
advantage.	 It	 suggests	 that	 every	 country	 should	 focus	 on	 producing/providing	 what	
they	 are	 best	 at	 producing,	 and	 trade	 that	 product	 or	 service	 for	 other	 products	 or	
services.	 Even	 where	 a	 country	 is	 not	 ‘the	 absolute	 best’	 at	 anything,	 comparative	
advantage	 says	 that	 countries	 should	 specialise	 in	 those	 industries	where	 they	have	a	
clear	chance	at	outperforming	other	countries.	
	
Comparative	 advantage	 is	 not	 an	 unchallenged	
theory,	but	it	is	the	basis	for	all	global	and	regional	
customs	and	 free	 trade	areas.	At	present,	 Ireland	
and	 Northern	 Ireland	 have	 slightly	 differing	
comparative	advantages.	Northern	Ireland,	as	part	
of	 the	 UK,	 is	 within	 a	 very	 large	market	 and	 has	
ease	 of	 access	 to	 the	 City	 of	 London,	 UK	
government	 support,	 and	 direct	 access	 to	 EU	
customers	 and	 suppliers.	 Ireland,	 on	 the	 other	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 will	
take	 us	 years	 to	 negotiate	 a	
new	 trade	deal—it	will	 not,	 for	
the	 simple	 reason	 that,	 if	 firms	
want	 our	 products,	 they	 will	
continue	to	buy	them.”	
Sammy	Wilson,	DUP.		
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hand,	 currently	 has	 a	 comparatively	 low	 corporate	 tax	 rate,	 a	 concentration	 of	
multinational	pharma-chem	companies	and	technology	firms,	and,	again,	direct	access	
to	 the	 EU.	 Both	 operate	 as	 English-language	 entry	 points	 to	 the	 EU	 for	 international	
firms.		
	
Brexit	would	change	the	basis	on	which	the	UK,	and	necessarily	Northern	Ireland,	trades	
regionally	and	globally.	It	would	also	impact	on	how	Ireland	would	position	itself.	First,	
Ireland	 would	 become	 the	 sole	 English-language	 entry	 point	 (besides	 Malta)	 for	
international	firms	seeking	to	do	business	in	the	EU.	This	would	undoubtedly	represent	
an	 advantage	 as	 English	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 main	 business	 languages.	 Second,	 on	
setting	 up	 in	 Ireland	 or	 importing/exporting	 through	 Ireland,	 international	 businesses	
would	only	have	to	comply	with	a	single	set	of	regulations	to	access	all	other	EU	states.	
A	business	setting	up	in	Northern	Ireland,	on	the	other	hand,	would	guarantee	its	access	
to	the	rest	of	the	UK	under	a	single	set	of	rules	–	but	not	necessarily	its	access	to	the	EU	
under	the	same	rules.	
	
How	easy	it	would	be	to	access	the	EU	market	from	a	post-Brexit	UK	would	be	entirely	
reliant	on	the	trade	model	chosen	by	the	EU	and	the	UK.	This	could	be	based	upon	the	
World	Trade	Organisation,	upon	 the	Norwegian	or	 Swiss	model,	 or	 some	 third	option	
(like	 the	 EU-Canada	 trade	 agreement).	 However,	 agreeing	 upon	 such	 a	model	 would	
take	time,	and	the	 interim	uncertainty	will	make	attracting	both	 foreign	and	domestic	
investment	 difficult.	 Ireland	would	 not	 face	 such	 uncertainty,	 amplifying	 the	 different	
positions	it	and	Northern	Ireland	are	in.		
	
Take,	 for	example,	 the	support	 that	 the	agricultural	 industry	now	receives.	Farmers	 in	
Ireland	 would	 continue	 to	 have	 unrestricted	 access	 to	 the	 EU	 market	 as	 well	 as	
continuing	 to	 receive	 substantial	 subsidies.	 While,	 for	 now,	 the	 UK	 Government	 has	
promised	 to	 continue	 agricultural	 support	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit,	
there	 is	no	guarantee	that	this	support	would	continue	 in	the	 longer	run.	But	perhaps	
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more	 seriously,	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 agricultural	 industry	 would,	 post-Brexit,	 have	 to	
compete	with	the	highly	protected	industry	in	Ireland	and	the	rest	of	Europe.	It	would	
be	 in	 the	 same	 trade	 position	 as	 countries	 such	 as	 Australia,	 New	 Zealand	 and	
agriculture-dominated	developing	countries	such	as	Brazil,	Argentina	and	Kenya.	
	
At	the	World	Trade	Organisation	non-EU	countries	have,	for	many	years,	been	arguing	
for	 reduction	 in	 agricultural	 support	 within	 Europe	 and	 the	 US,	 but	 with	 very	 little	
success.	Given	that	talks	at	the	WTO	are	at	a	standstill	(in	no	small	part	because	of	a	lack	
of	movement	 on	 agriculture)	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	WTO	membership	will	 provide	 the	UK	
with	a	more	‘global’	position	in	agriculture	or	other	industries.		
	
In	short,	following	Brexit,	the	UK	would	in	theory	be	free	to	attempt	to	establish	trade	
agreements	with	any	country	at	all.	But	in	practice	this	is	likely	to	prove	difficult.	For	a	
decade,	the	World	Trade	Organisation	has	been	at	a	standstill,	and	the	current	trend	is	
toward	mega-regional	 arrangements	 such	as	 the	EU-US	TTIP	 trade	agreement,	not	bi-
lateral	arrangements.	Indeed,	the	US	has	clearly	stated	that	it	 is	not	interested	in	a	bi-
lateral	deal,	a	position	reinforced	by	President	Obama	visit	where	he	clearly	stated	he	
wished	to	continue	dealing	with	a	UK	that	is	part	of	the	EU.	
	
For	 all	 of	 its	 faults,	 comparative	 advantage	 remains	 the	mainstay	 of	 global	 trade.	 For	
Northern	Ireland	in	particular,	industry	might	stand	to	lose	more	than	it	stands	to	gain	
from	EU	independence.	The	actual	trade	‘winners’	of	a	Brexit	would	in	all	likelihood	be	
Ireland,	whose	comparative	advantages	would	be	solidified	by	the	changes.	 	
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5. Brexit’s	Import/Export	Costs	to	Northern	Ireland	Industry	
	
The	 Remain	 and	 Brexit	 campaigns	 do	 not	 agree	 on	much,	 but	 all	 sides	 concede	 that	
withdrawal	 would	 have	 consequences	 on	 how	 goods	 and	 services	move	 between	 EU	
states	and	the	UK.	Currently,	with	both	 Ireland	and	the	UK	 in	the	EU,	 from	a	business	
perspective	the	Irish	border	is	visible	only	on	maps;	but	Ireland	as	the	UK’s	single	land	
border	with	the	EU	may	become	a	crunch	point	at	which	the	EU’s	tariffs	and	regulations	
start	to	apply.	
	
Clear	descriptions	of	a	post-Brexit	business	environment	are	difficult	as	much	depends	
on	the	arrangements	struck	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	For	instance,	if	the	UK	remains	
in	 the	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (EEA),	 the	 free	
movement	of	goods	and	services	between	 Ireland	
and	 the	UK	would	 be	maintained,	 though	 the	UK	
could	set	 its	own	border	 tariffs.	But,	as	 is	 likely,	a	
more	 comprehensive	 withdrawal	 or	 a	 Swiss-style	
agreement	 would	 mean	 that	 UK	 goods	 and	
services	 would	 become	 subject	 to	 the	 EU’s	
external	tariffs.	This	option,	often	accompanied	by	
references	 to	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organization	
(WTO),	would	increase	import	and	export	costs	for	a	significant	number	of	products	as	
well	 as	 a	 plethora	 of	 restrictions	 to	 cross-border	movement	 of	 services.	 Any	 of	 these	
options	 would	 also	 mean	 an	 end	 to	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 payments	 to	
farmers	which	would	naturally	have	a	knock-on	effect	on	the	agri-food	sector.	
	
It	 is	 easy	 to	 assume	 that	 such	 changes	 will	 only	 hit	 business	 and	 not	 the	 private	
consumer,	however,	this	is	only	a	partial	view.	For	instance,	just	as	gifts	above	a	certain	
value	 from	 the	US	are	 subject	 to	 customs,	packages	 sent	between	 relatives	 in	 Ireland	
and	Northern	 Ireland	would	also	have	 to	pay.	Personal	 items	are	ordinarily	exempted	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	 uncertainty	 about	 the	
financial	assistance	that	may	be	
on	 offer	 to	 our	 farming	
communities	 …	 exists	 equally	
whether	 we	 stay	 in	 Europe	 or	
leave	it.”	
Gregory	Campbell,	DUP.		
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from	border	charges;	but	anyone	operating	a	small	business,	or	moving	products	across	
the	border	for	work	purposes,	would	need	to	declare	what	those	products	are	and	pay	
levies	on	them	according	to	the	EU’s	WTO	tariffs.	While	a	 lot	of	products	come	with	a	
0%	tariff,	not	all	sectors	benefit	from	‘free’	 imports	and	exports.	Cigarettes	and	cigars,	
for	 instance,	are	hit	with	a	33-58%	import	duty.	A	wide	variety	of	consumer	products,	
such	 as	make-up	 and	 personal	 hygiene	 items,	 textiles	 and	 basic	 building	 construction	
items	(such	as	doors	and	windows)	face	import	charges	of	between	4	and	8%.	Clothing	is	
generally	met	with	import	duties	ranging	from	8	to	17%,	and	cars	face	import	duties	of	
10-20%	depending	on	 their	 size	 and	purpose.	 In	 the	 end,	 as	 import	 tariffs	 are	 always	
pushed	onto	 the	consumer	within	 the	purchasing	price,	many	products	moving	across	
the	border	could	suddenly	become	anywhere	from	5%	to	25%	more	expensive.	
	
The	 impact	 upon	 the	 agri-food	 and	 farming	 sector	 is	 particularly	 revealing.	 Most	
agricultural	products	and	 livestock	are	subject	to	EU	 import	tariffs	of	between	6%	and	
22%.	UK	agri-food	products	would	find	it	difficult	to	compete	with	heavily	subsided	EU	
produce	 on	 the	 global	 market	 without	 reducing	 their	 basic	 costs	 in	 order	 to	 be	
competitively	priced.	Even	within	the	UK,	it	is	likely	that	suppliers	will	use	the	cheapest	
available	option	which,	due	to	CAP	subsidies,	may	very	well	still	be	EU	products,	even	
with	 the	 imposition	 of	 UK	 tariffs	 on	 imports	 from	 the	 EU.	 Statistics	 from	 the	 UK	
Department	 of	 Environment,	 Food	 and	 Rural	 Affairs	 demonstrate	 that	 direct	 EU	
payments	 to	 farmers	 represent	 87%	 of	 annual	 farm	 income	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	
Department	 also	 confirmed	 that	 in	 the	 last	 10	 years	 (2005-2014)	 CAP	 Single	 Farm	
Payment	alone	totalled	£2.5	billion	in	Northern	Ireland.	While	the	UK	Government	has	
stated	that	 initially	 it	would	match	CAP	support	 in	event	of	Brexit	 its	previously	stated	
reform	proposals	indicate	that	it	may	be	unlikely	to	match	the	current	levels	of	subsidy	
and/or	 would	 require	 more	 from	 farmers	 in	 return	 for	 support,	 for	 example	 in	
environmental	protection.	
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Real	limitations	will	also	come	to	those	who	are	hoping	to	establish	a	business	in	or	send	
employees	to	parts	of	the	EU.	Under	the	EU	free	movement	of	services	rules,	both	to	set	
a	business	abroad	and	to	work	(whether	for	a	day,	a	week,	or	a	year)	in	many	sectors	is	
relatively	 straightforward.	 Post	 Brexit,	 under	 the	WTO,	 these	 will	 be	 covered	 by	 the	
General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Service	 (GATS)	 which	 is	 significantly	 less	 open	 to	
services	movement	than	the	EU	is.	Non-EU	nationals	temporarily	staying	and	working	in	
the	EU,	unless	they	are	in	senior	management,	will	find	far	more	barriers	to	travel.	Post-
Brexit,	 virtually	 all	 UK	 nationals	 would	 need	 to	 satisfy	 national	 immigration	
requirements	 to	 temporarily	 stay	 and	 work	 in	 any	 of	 the	 28	 EU	 Member	 States,	
including	 Ireland.	 For	 instance,	 Ireland	 permits	 access	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 computer-
related	data	entry	work,	but	has	not	opened	up	any	access	for	those	hoping	to	provide	
real	 estate-related	 services.	 	 Such	 rules	 vary	 in	 each	 of	 the	 28	 states.	 Establishing	 a	
commercial	 presence	 in	 an	 EU	Member	 State	 also	 becomes	 complicated	 as	 the	WTO	
does	not	contain	a	single	‘rule’	on	setting	up	a	business.		
	
It	 is	 impossible	 to	 say	 with	 absolutely	 certainly	 what	 a	 post-Brexit	 UK	 business	
environment	will	look	like	but	what	is	clear	is	that	for	many	areas,	and	in	particular	the	
agricultural	and	services	sectors,	it	will	be	more	complicated	and	expensive	if	you	wish	
to	do	business	outside	the	UK.	Even	within	the	UK	competing	against	certain	imported	
products,	especially	in	the	agricultural	sector,	will	almost	certainly	be	harder.	While	the	
UK	 could	 take	a	protectionist	 route	and	 increase	 tariffs	 to	protect	 its	 home	produced	
goods	 and	 services,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 opposite	 of	 pro-Brexit	 plans	 to	make	 trade	
deals	with	the	world.	In	the	event	of	Brexit,	all	areas	of	business	will	have	to	recalibrate	
their	strategies	to	meet	the	new	legal	and	commercial	environment.	 	
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6. Brexit	and	the	Loss	of	EU	Funding	to	Northern	Ireland	
	
Both	 Ireland	 and	 Northern	 Ireland	 benefit	 from	 several	 funding	 streams	 available	
through	 the	 EU.	 Under	 the	 EU	 Cohesion	 Policy	 (2014-2020)	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	
designated	 as	 a	 region	 in	 transition,	 whereas	
Ireland	 is	 in	 the	 more	 developed	 category.	 Thus	
the	 border	 separates	 different	 funding	 regimes.	
Under	 this	 categorisation	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	
currently	able	to	access	more	funding	than	Ireland.	
	
There	 are	 also	 specific	 programmes	which	 follow	
from	 the	 peace	 process	 which	 are	 aimed	 at	
increasing	 cross-border	 co-operation.	 The	 Special	 EU	 Programmes	 Body	 (PEACE	 IV	
Programme	 (2014-2020))	 provides	 funding	 to	 manage	 cross-border	 European	 Union	
Structural	 Funds	 programmes	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 Border	 Region	 of	 Ireland	 and	
parts	of	Western	Scotland.	The	programme	was	agreed	between	the	Irish	Government	
and	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	and	covers	the	entire	border	region.	Over	the	course	
of	the	programme	€229m	will	be	made	available,	85%	of	which	comes	from	the	EU	with	
the	remainder	from	Ireland	and	Northern	Ireland	budgets.	
	
INTERREG	 IVA	 provides	 structural	 funding	 for	 border	 regions.	 Ireland	 and	 Northern	
Ireland	 fall	 within	 several	 of	 the	 designated	 regions,	 North	 West	 Europe,	 Northern	
Periphery	 and	 Artic	 and	 the	 Atlantic	 Area.	 Under	 the	 Programme,	 Ireland/Northern	
Ireland/Scotland	is	recognised	as	a	region	requiring	specific	funding.	This	programme	is	
worth	 €240	 million,	 with	 €42	 million	 of	 matching	 funding	 from	 Ireland	 and	 the	 UK.	
Should	 the	UK	 leave	 the	 EU	 there	would	 again	 be	 a	 substantial	 shortfall	 in	 the	 funds	
available	for	this	scheme.	
	
Campaigning	Claim	
“The	Treasury	…	will	have	more	
money;	money	 that	will	 not	 go	
to	 Brussels	 but	 will	 come	 to	
Belfast,	 Ballymoney	 and	 other	
parts	of	the	United	Kingdom.”	
Mervyn	Storey,	DUP.		
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Both	 of	 these	 schemes	 are	 aimed	 at	 providing	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 benefits	
across	the	border	regions	of	the	island.	While	it	is	possible	that	additional	funding	may	
be	available	as	 the	UK	will	no	 longer	be	 required	 to	contribute	 to	 the	EU	budget,	 this	
money	 has	 not	 been	 earmarked	 and	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 equivalent	 schemes	
would	 be	 funded.	 It	 would	 also	 require	 separate	 negotiation	 between	 London	 and	
Dublin.	
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7. The	Loss	of	Brussels	as	a	Place	of	Partnership	
	
Much	has	been	made	about	whether	Brexit	would	threaten	peace	in	Northern	Ireland.	
When	Taoiseach	Enda	Kenny	 spoke	of	 the	 ‘serious	difficulties’	Brexit	would	 create	 for	
the	 Northern	 Ireland	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 peace	
process	 (and	engaged	 in	 repeated	 trips	 to	 the	UK	
in	 the	 weeks	 prior	 to	 the	 Referendum	 vote)	 his	
input	 was	 met	 with	 scepticism	 by	 some	 UK	
politicians.	 The	 House	 of	 Commons’	 Northern	
Ireland	 Affairs	 Committee	 was,	 for	 example,	
content	that	the	relations	between	London,	Dublin	
and	 Belfast	 would	 ‘continue	 to	 be	 very	 strong’	
even	 if	 the	 UK	 left	 the	 EU,	 moreover,	 they	 suggested	 that	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 less	
important	 for	 conflict	 resolution	 than	 the	 US.	 Nonetheless,	 potentially	 there	 are	
arguments	 to	 made	 regarding	 a	 less	 visible	 impact	 upon	 the	 peace	 process	 from	
membership	of	the	EU.		
	
Prior	to	1974,	partition	had	long	overshadowed	other	aspects	of	the	UK’s	relations	with	
Ireland.	In	1956,	the	Northern	Ireland	Government	produced	Why	the	Border	Must	Be,	a	
staunch	defence	of	partition	capped	by	a	grudging	recognition	that	‘although	Ulster	and	
Eire	 cannot	 unite,	 they	 can	be	 good	neighbours’.	 But	 in	 spite	 of	 the	UK	 and	 Ireland’s	
Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 in	 1965,	 and	 the	meetings	 that	 year	 between	 Taoiseach	 Seán	
Lemass	and	Northern	Ireland’s	Terence	O’Neill,	official	interactions	remained	limited.		
	
As	 the	UK	remained	 Ireland’s	biggest	market,	 it	was	all	but	obliged	 to	 follow	the	UK’s	
efforts	 to	 join	 the	 then-EEC	 in	 the	 1960s.	With	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 Troubles,	 UK-Ireland	
relations	 became	 entangled	 within	 the	 increasingly	 bloody	 conflict.	 When	 in	 1971	
Ireland	 challenged	 the	 UK’s	 use	 of	 “enhanced	 interrogation”	 practices	 to	 get	
information	 out	 of	 internees	 as	 amounting	 to	 torture	 before	 the	 European	 Court	 of	
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Human	 Rights,	 archival	 releases	 show	 that	 UK	 officials	 regarded	 this	 response	 as	
tantamount	to	‘a	diplomatic	declaration	of	war’.	
	
EEC	 membership,	 however,	 brought	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 this	 fraught	 relationship.	
Ireland	 and	 the	 UK,	 as	 English-speaking	 islands	 on	 Europe’s	 North-West	 periphery,	
shared	many	interests	in	terms	of	European	policy.	European	Summits	obliged	ministers	
from	both	countries	to	participate	in	the	communal	“family	photographs”	and	enabled	
them	to	 forge	working	 relationships	 in	a	 context	 less	burdened	with	expectation	 than	
the	 intermittent	 bilateral	 meetings	 of	 the	 1970s.	 In	 1980,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 Margaret	
Thatcher	and	Charles	Haughey	 remained	cagy	about	dealing	with	each	other,	 the	EEC	
summit	 in	Venice	offered	a	forum	for	both	to	address	pressing	concerns	regarding	the	
security	situation	in	Northern	Ireland	and	build	up	good	will.	
	
By	 the	 mid-1980s,	 when	 the	 Haughey-Thatcher	 relationship	 had	 soured	 and	 the	
aftermath	of	 the	Hunger	Strikes	made	 the	conflict	appear	as	 intractable	as	ever,	 John	
Hume	was	instrumental	in	securing	the	European	Parliament’s	Haagerup	Report	into	the	
conflict	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	The	Report	approached	 the	conflict	as	a	clash	of	national	
identities	 and	 conceived	 of	 Europe’s	 role	 as	 supporting	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland	 in	 their	
efforts	 to	promote	peaceful	expression	of	 these	 identities	within	Northern	 Ireland.	As	
such,	it	provided	a	starting	point	for	the	Anglo-Irish	Agreement	negotiations.	
	
The	Haagerup	Report	also	emphasised	the	need	for	Europe	to	support	these	efforts	with	
funding.	The	House	of	Commons’	Committee	Report	makes	out	that	Europe	was	‘late	to	
the	party’,	providing	 funding	 through	 its	PEACE	 initiative	 (now	 in	 its	 fourth	cycle)	only	
after	 the	 peace	 process	 was	 underway.	 By	 focussing	 only	 on	 one	 stream	 of	 funding,	
however,	the	Committee	downplays	Europe’s	 intense	regional	development	funding	in	
Northern	Ireland	since	the	1970s	and	payments	into	the	International	Fund	for	Ireland	
in	the	1980s.			
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The	UK	and	Ireland’s	shared	EU	membership	was	emphasised	in	the	Good	Friday/Belfast	
Agreement,	 building	 on	 previous	 references	 in	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 Agreement.	 The	
implementation	of	EU	law	provides	one	of	the	Agreement’s	one	of	the	major	conduits	
for	 co-operation	 between	 Belfast	 and	 Dublin.	 The	 North-South	 Ministerial	 Council’s	
responsibility	for	discussing	harmonious	approaches	to	the	implementation	of	EU	law	in	
both	parts	of	the	island	of	Ireland	provides	much	of	its	workload.			
	
The	 peace	 process	 will	 not	 implode	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Brexit,	 nor	 will	 Ireland’s	 close	
relations	 with	 the	 UK	 degrade	 overnight.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 EU’s	 role	 in	 building	 this	
relationship	should	not	be	 forgotten.	Whereas	 the	European	Project	drew	 Ireland	and	
the	UK	closer	 together,	Brexit	would	 impose	new	strains	on	 the	relationship.	 Ireland’s	
trade	with	the	rest	of	Europe	has	dramatically	increased	since	1974,	making	its	economy	
much	less	dependent	upon	the	UK,	but	 in	purely	economic	terms	it	will	still	be	the	EU	
country	most	affected	by	Brexit.	Over	time,	Ireland’s	increasing	integration	with	Europe	
would	 likely	put	 it	at	odds	with	a	UK	which	 is	no	 longer	playing	on	the	same	team.	 In	
that	event,	the	mutual	working	which	has	provided	the	bedrock	for	the	peace	process	
will	inevitably	be	under	threat.	
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8. The	EU	Referendum	and	the	UK’s	Constitutional	Arrangements	
	
a.	Divergence	between	the	Northern	Ireland	Vote	and	the	Overall	UK	Vote	
For	 some	 years	 now,	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 peace	 process	 have	
enjoyed	 multilateral	 support	 from	 the	 main	Westminster	 political	 parties.	 The	 peace	
process	 has	 benefited	 from	 this	 position	 largely	 (though	 not	 entirely)	 outside	 of	 the	
usual	 ‘cut	 and	 thrust’	 party	 politics.	 Although	 it	 is	 not	 the	 express	 intention	 of	 the	
current	Conservative	Government	to	change	this	understanding,	the	EU	referendum	has	
sharply	divided	opinion	in	terms	of	its	implications	for	NI.	This	might	put	the	multilateral	
approach	 to	 Northern	 Ireland	 at	 Westminster	 at	 risk	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 EU	
referendum.	
	
In	addition,	as	has	been	more	often	recognised	 in	
the	Scottish	context,	a	Brexit	which	does	not	enjoy	
the	support	of	Northern	Ireland	as	one	of	the	UK’s	
four	 constituent	 nations	 would	 carry	 symbolic	
importance.	 In	 the	 1975	 EEC	 membership	
referendum	all	 four	constituent	nations	of	 the	UK	
backed	EU	membership	(with	Northern	Ireland	having	the	narrowest	majority	in	favour).	
If	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland	adopt	a	position	on	EU	membership	at	variance	with	
the	 remainder	 of	 the	 UK	 such	 a	 vote	 could	 exacerbate	 tensions	 surrounding	 its	
constitutional	position.	
	
Even	 if	 the	 EU	 referendum	does	 not	 lead	 to	 Brexit,	 the	UK	Government’s	 negotiating	
platform	 could	 undermine	 relations	 between	 the	 Westminster	 and	 the	 devolved	
legislatures.	 As	 they	 stand,	 the	 proposals	 for	 national	 parliaments	 to	 “red	 card”	 EU	
policy	proposals	 (like	 the	existing	“yellow	card”	and	“orange	card”	mechanisms)	could	
be	 operated	 by	 the	UK	Government	without	 any	 need	 to	 seek	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	
devolved	 institutions.	Given	 the	 importance	of	agriculture	within	 the	Northern	 Ireland	
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economy,	for	example,	Northern	Ireland’s	interests	could	diverge	from	those	of	the	UK	
as	a	whole	in	shared	competence	areas	related	to	agriculture.	
	
Within	 the	 Good	 Friday/Belfast	 Agreement,	 the	 UK	 and	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 ‘as	
partners	 in	 the	 European	 Union’	 and	 as	 equal	 Council	 of	 Europe	 members	 (with	 its	
associated	 requirement	 of	 adherence	 to	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights)	
provided	much	of	 the	deal’s	 supranational	 architecture.	 There	are	 two	brief	points	 to	
note	here.	First,	there	is	significant	intricacy	in	the	way	in	which	(at	least)	three	sets	of	
international	law	obligations	are	intertwined.	The	EU,	the	European	Convention	and	the	
Good	 Friday/Belfast	 Agreement	 are	 essentially	 interdependent	 in	 their	 application	 to	
Northern	 Ireland.	Second	 is	 the	perceived	 importance	of	 the	EU	as	a	peace-sustaining	
enterprise	 playing	 a	 stabilising	 role	 within	 Northern	 Ireland.	 Many	 within	 Northern	
Ireland	regard	the	connection	of	the	UK	and	Ireland	through	the	EU	as	underpinning	the	
Good	Friday/Belfast	Agreement.	
	
b.		The	EU	and	Human	Rights	
The	referendum	also	poses	significant	and	complex	questions	for	the	position	of	human	
rights	 protections	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 There	 exists	 an	 overlap	 between	 the	
Government’s	 human	 rights	 plans	 and	 EU	 questions.	 EU	membership	 is	 connected	 to	
human	 rights	 protections	 which	 themselves	 are	
essential	 for	 compliance	 with	 the	 Good	
Friday/Belfast	 Agreement.	 As	 such,	 to	 practically	
‘escape’	 ECHR	 standards,	 the	 UK	 would	 have	 to	
part	 company	 with	 both	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 ECHR.	
There	 is	 therefore	 a	 crucial	 interaction	 between	
EU	 membership	 debates	 and	 any	 forthcoming	
changes	to	the	UK’s	human	rights	architecture.	
	
Brexit	 will	 not	 remove	 the	 influence	 of	 pan-
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European	governance	structures	within	Northern	Ireland.	Efforts	by	the	EU	to	sign	up	to	
the	 articles	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 have	 followed	 extensive	
negotiations	 and	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 human	 rights	 within	 EU	 law.	 Although	 a	
recent	and	controversial	opinion	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union	 raised	
doubts	 over	 whether	 it	 was	 legally	 possible	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 become	 a	 party	 to	 the	
European	 Convention,	 these	 international	 legal	 orders	 are	 likely	 to	 continue	 to	
intertwine.	 These	 interrelationships	 have	 been	 scarcely	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	
debates	over	the	UK’s	place	in	Europe.	
	
Human	rights	have	been	a	central	plank	of	the	peace	process	 in	Northern	Ireland.	The	
degree	 to	 which	 shortfalls	 in	 enforceable	 human	 rights	 standards	 within	 Northern	
Ireland	 law	 exacerbated	 and	 sustained	 the	 Troubles	 is	 marked	 by	 the	 importance	 of	
human	 rights	 safeguards	 within	 the	 Good	 Friday/Belfast	 Agreement.	 The	 EU-ECHR	
interaction	should	be	considered	important	in	light	of	plans	to	change	the	Human	Rights	
Act.	
	
The	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 impact	 of	 Brexit	 on	 the	 1998	 settlement	 should	 be	
managed	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 possible	 and	 not	 left	 to	 ad	 hoc	 solutions	 (or	 indeed,	
political	crises).	This	could	be	achieved	through	the	UK	Government	seeking	a	Bilateral	
Interpretive	Agreement	with	 the	 Irish	Government	 in	advance	of	 the	EU	Referendum.	
Ireland	 sought	 a	 similar	 agreement	 before	 its	 2004	 citizenship	 referendum.	 Such	 an	
Agreement	 would	 allow	 both	 countries	 to	 establish,	 in	 advance	 of	 Brexit,	 how	 UK	
withdrawal	 from	 the	 EU	 would	 impact	 upon	 the	 1998	 arrangements	 and	 Northern	
Ireland’s	constitutional	arrangements	more	generally.	Such	an	Agreement	would	be	 in	
keeping	 with	 Ireland’s	 position	 as	 co-guarantor	 of	 the	 peace	 process.	 Should	 Brexit	
occur	in	the	absence	of	such	an	agreement,	the	UK	and	Irish	Governments	should	seek	
to	 agree	 a	 common	 position	 on	 the	 affected	 provisions	 of	 the	 Good	 Friday/Belfast	
Agreement	 	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 do	 so	 to	mitigate	 the	 consequent	 uncertainty	
surrounding	Northern	Ireland’s	governance.	
